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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

NICOLAS C. SMITH-WASHINGTON, on
behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated,

Plaintiff,

vs.

TAXACT, INC., an Iowa Corporation,

Defendant.

Case No.: 3:23-cv-00830-VC

**DEFENDANT TAXACT, INC.'S
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S
ADMINISTRATIVE MOTION TO STRIKE
OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR LEAVE
TO FILE A SURREPLY TO DEFENDANT
TAXACT, INC.'s MOTION TO STAY
UNDER 9 U.S.C. § 3**

Date: May 18, 2023

Time: 10:00 a.m.

Place: Courtroom 4, 17th Floor

Case Removed: February 23, 2023
(Superior Court of California Alameda
County, Case No. 23cv026204)

1 Defendant TaxAct, Inc. (“TaxAct”) opposes Plaintiff’s Administrative Motion to Strike, or in
2 the Alternative, for Leave to File a Surreply to TaxAct’s Motion to Stay Under 9 U.S.C. § 3
3 (“Administrative Motion”). Plaintiff claims that TaxAct “improperly raised” arguments for the first
4 time in its Reply in Support of its Motion to Stay Under 9 U.S.C. § 3, ECF No. 33. That assertion is
5 without merit.

6 On March 3, 2023, TaxAct moved to stay this proceeding pending the completion of
7 arbitration. In its opening brief, TaxAct argued that, consistent with the Federal Arbitration Act
8 (“FAA”), the Arbitration Agreement between Plaintiff and TaxAct requires that Plaintiff’s claims be
9 arbitrated in confidential binding arbitration. TaxAct filed the current Arbitration Agreement to
10 which Plaintiff agreed as an attachment to its supporting materials. Declaration of Ian Campbell in
11 Support of Motion to Stay (“Campbell Decl.”), Ex. A, ECF No. 12-2. That Arbitration Agreement
12 expressly incorporates by reference the Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services Streamlined
13 Arbitration Rules and Procedures (“JAMS Rules”), which provide that disputes over the formation,
14 existence, validity, interpretation, or scope of an arbitration agreement shall be submitted to and
15 ruled on by the arbitrator. *Id.*

16 In his opposition brief, Plaintiff does not dispute that his claims fall within the scope of the
17 Arbitration Agreement. Instead, he raised what is essentially an affirmative defense – i.e., that the
18 Arbitration Agreement was invalid and unenforceable as to him. TaxAct responded to that argument
19 by pointing back to the terms of the Arbitration Agreement included in its opening submission, as
20 well as relevant caselaw. The terms of the Arbitration Agreement make clear that it is the arbitrator,
21 who shall rule on “[j]urisdictional and arbitrability disputes, including disputes over the formation,
22 existence, validity, interpretation or scope of the agreement under which Arbitration is sought....”
23 Reply Br., ECF No. 33 at 2; Declaration of Mark Jaeger (“Jaeger Decl.”), ECF No. 33-3, Ex. B, at 8.

24 In moving to stay this litigation, TaxAct was not required to anticipate or preemptively
25 respond to an affirmative defense of enforceability. This was not pleaded in the Complaint; TaxAct
26 did not “waive” its right to enforce this delegation by responding to a new matter raised in Plaintiff’s
27 Opposition. Indeed, in the specific context of the FAA, it is appropriate for the moving party to

1 assert its right to enforce a contractual delegation clause in the reply brief where a party raises
 2 enforceability issues for the first time in its opposition brief. For instance, in *Schwendeman v. Health*
 3 *Carousel, LLC*, No. 18-CV-07641-BLF, 2019 WL 6173163, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2019), the
 4 defendant moved to compel arbitration and to dismiss the action. The plaintiff argued that the
 5 defendant waived its right to enforce the delegation clause because the defendant did not raise the
 6 issue until its reply brief. *Id.* at *1, 3. The Court rejected that argument, pointing out that given the
 7 “strong federal policy favoring enforcement of arbitration agreements,” the party asserting waiver
 8 (here, Plaintiff) “bears a heavy burden of proof.” *Id.* at *3 (internal quotation marks and citation
 9 omitted). The Court concluded that “Health Carousel asserted the delegation clause as soon as
 10 Schwendeman argued specific contract interpretation issues in opposition to the motion” and that
 11 none of the authorities upon which Schwendeman relied supported a finding of waiver. *Id.* at *6.

12 So too here. TaxAct was “merely responding to Plaintiff’s opposition argument, which is
 13 permitted and may be considered by the Court in its discretion.” *Cole v. Adam*, No. 17-05691 BLF
 14 (PR), 2019 WL 1048251, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2019) (Labson Freeman, J.); *see also In re*
 15 *PersonalWeb Techs., LLC*, No. 18-md-02834-BLF, 2019 WL 1975432, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 6,
 16 2019) (“The Court finds that Amazon’s arguments regarding CloudFront were properly limited to
 17 responding to PersonalWeb’s arguments in its opposition. Accordingly, the Court denies
 18 PersonalWeb’s request to strike Section H of Amazon’s reply.”). Moreover, none of Plaintiff’s
 19 authorities are apposite.¹ Instead, each case involved new arguments that were not responsive to
 20 issues first raised in the opposition brief. *See Graves v. Arpaio*, 623 F.3d 1043,1050-51 (9th Cir.
 21 2010) (rejecting appellant’s argument made for first time in reply brief that district court erred in
 22 placing burden on him to demonstrate that statutory requirements for relief from consent decree were
 23 met); *United States v. Patterson*, 230 F.3d 1168, 1172 n.3 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that criminal
 24

25 ¹ In the Administrative Motion, Plaintiff provides the following quotation: “‘It is well-established
 26 that a moving party is not permitted to offer new evidence or arguments in a reply brief.’” Plaintiff
 27 attributes this quotation to *Graves v. Arpaio*, 623 F.3d 1043,1048 (9th Cir. 2010). This language
 28 does not come from *Graves*. It appears in the plaintiff’s motion to strike the defendant’s reply in
Cinematix, LLC v. Einthusan, No. 19-CV-02749-EMC, 2020 WL 227180 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2020),
 a case dismissed on the ground of *forum non conveniens*.

defendant waived his request to withdraw plea, which he raised for first time in reply brief on appeal and for which he “offer[ed] no argument other than the suggestion that he does not like the resulting sentence if his appeal is denied”); *Bazuaye v. I.N.S.*, 79 F.3d 118, 120 (9th Cir. 1996) (concluding that appellant waived the “rational basis” argument raised for first time in reply brief, but noting that “his argument fails, even if we were to accept his questionable statutory construction”); *California Sportfishing Prot. All. v. Pac. States Indus., Inc.*, No. 15-CV-01482-JD, 2015 WL 5569073, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2015) (refusing to consider new arguments made in reply brief in support of motion to dismiss that were not responsive to plaintiff’s opposition).

TaxAct timely and properly raised the delegation clause as a reply to Plaintiff’s arguments regarding the validity of the Arbitration Agreement, and has not waived the argument that threshold issues regarding arbitrability have been delegated to the arbitrator. Accordingly, TaxAct respectfully requests that this Court deny Plaintiff’s motion to strike and request for leave to file a surreply.

Date: May 15, 2023

Respectfully submitted,

By: /s/ Sheila A.G. Armbrust

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